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Abstract. Several of the designers of the 2017 Tax Act were prominent as ‘supply side‛ 
advocates at the time of Reagan tax cuts during the 1980s. The economic argument for 
supply side tax rate reductions drew on a policy mix framework developed by Robert 
Mundell as early as 1962. Within that framework, the easy fiscal/ tight monetary policy 
solution was intended for circumstances of either pressure on reserves or the exchange rate 
(as during the Kennedy Administration) or of serious domestic inflation (as under the 
Carter and Reagan Administrations). Tax cuts in the US since the 1980s have not had the 
intended stimulus effects because neither the currency weakness nor inflationary 
preconditions have existed. Absent such conditions, tax rate reductions will generate either 
domestic over-heating or a redistribution of income to those in higher brackets. Any 
argument in favor of the 2017 Tax Act should not fall back on Mundell’s policy mix 
advocacy. In contrast, the case for an easy fiscal/ tight money policy may have unexpected 
force in situations of fixed exchange rates, or where domestic monetary policy options are 
otherwise constrained or absent – as in Eurozone periphery countries. 
Keywords. Supply side economics, Robert Mundell, Policy Mix classifications, 2017 Tax 
Act, Eurozone macroeconomics. 
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1. Introduction: A Look Backward 
n interesting backstory regarding the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act is that its 
lead whisperers, who were to some extent also its drafters, were advocates 
fromthe late 1970s Stagflation and early Reagan years: Stephen Moore, Art 
Laffer, Larry Kudlow, and Steve Forbes. All of them self-identify as ‘supply-
siders’, a description that has lost favor. But in their minds, this is a supply-side tax 
bill, a victory for the view they have been advocating, and writing iterative op-ed 
columns about, for nearly 40 years. It will be useful to review both the conceptual 
framework of the supply-side ‘policy mix‛ and some history of its implementation. 
The academic heavyweight of the cause was Robert Mundell, who won the 
1999 Nobel Prize for work on international monetary theory. He joined the IMF 
Research Department in 1961; his first foray into policy-making came soon after.  
The then-new Kennedy Administration was concerned about a combination of slow 
US growth alongside an outflow of US gold reserves. The US was pursuing what 
was called a ‚neo-classical synthesis‛, a policy mix of: 1) easy money, to 
encourage domestic growth; and 2) a budget surplus, to syphon off excess liquidity, 
and hence to reduce the outflow of US gold reserves. The policy was not working, 
as evidenced by a slow recovery from the 1960-1961 recession, a stock market 
plunge in mid-1962, and continued gold losses. Mundell proposed reversing the 
policy mix. At the end of 1962, Kennedy embraced the reversal, and announced tax 
reductions to spur the domestic economy and stiffer interest rates to protect the 
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balance of payments.1 This was a first round for the supply-side template that 
would be adopted again a couple of decades later. The tax cut, which reduced the 
top marginal rate from 91 to 70 percent, was passed in early 1964 (after Kennedy’s 
death) and probably strengthened recovery from the recession. 
The improvement was temporary. The US budget swelled as the Vietnam War 
build-up began in 1965. The US resorted to accommodative monetary policy – 
which again put the dollar’s gold convertibility as risk. Inflationary forces gathered 
steam by 1968; lapsing again into the ‚neo-classical synthesis‛ view of 1961-1962, 
the US responded with continued monetary expansion combined with a tax 
surcharge. The result was a recession in 1969-1971 alongside growing inflation, 
and continued reserve pressure on the dollar. But the dollar’s gold convertibility 
and exchange value were unsustainable in any event. An international shortage of 
monetary gold meant there was a demand for US dollars as a substitute reserve; but 
the only way the US could provide dollar reserves was to continue running balance 
of payments deficits, which undermined credibility of the gold link. By the early 
1970s, the postwar gold exchange standard had collapsed, major countries allowed 
their currencies to float, and years of worldwide inflation were underway. 
By 1980 the US had an economic environment with parallels to where it had 
been at the beginning of the Kennedy Administration.  Gold convertibility had long 
been abandoned, the dollar exchange was weak, and inflation was often running 
into double-digit annual rates; real tax rates were rising due to ‚bracket creep‛2, 
and real growth had slowed. The Carter Administration had in the late 1970s again 
followed the neoclassical synthesis of easy money combined with fiscal 
contraction. There was a widely-held view that the US needed a new macro-
economic policy. Supply-side economics, as it by then came to be called, drove 
much of the Reagan Administration’s economic policy mix. The Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 lowered the top marginal rate from 70 to 50 percent; but 
the fiscal portion of the mix included deficit-financed (‚demand side‛) stepped-up 
defense spending. In 1986, the top individual rate was lowered further to 28 
percent, and the corporate rate was also lowered. Paul Volcker’s Federal Reserve 
subdued price inflation - the latter at the cost of a sharp intervening recession 
during 1981-1983.  Supply-siders3, including Mundell (1993, p.120), criticized 
policy during the first Reagan term for: 1) spreading the tax cuts over a three-year 
period, which delayed their expansionary offset to the Fed’s tight money policy; 
and 2) not using a gold-link, or perhaps another fixed standard, more rapidly to 
stabilize expectations about the domestic and international values of the dollar. 
Economic growth resumed in the US in 1983, with much less inflation than during 
most of the 1970s. 
 
2. Supply-Side Economics - Context 
Mundell argued that the advantage asserted for floating exchange rates by 
monetarists and others during the 1960s and 1970s is usually illusory. Movements 
in exchange rates are a problem, he thought, not a solution, as hopes for policy 
autonomy soon gave way to general inflation; another consequence of resort to 
currency depreciation was a breakdown in fiscal discipline. Still another was rising 
real tax rates, as a result of bracket creep, which took a growing wedge out of 
private sector revenues, and hence became a drag on investment and growth. 
Mundell (1971; p.16) noted that the most successful post-WW2 economies, 
including Germany, Japan, and Italy, regularly lowered tax rates to offset drift into 
higher brackets; he similarly cites Canada’s decision in 1973 to index tax brackets 
to inflation as a supply-side success (Mundell, 1993; p.117). Inflation also meant 
that nominal capital gains would be taxed – even in the absence of real capital 
gains, or even in the face of real declines in capital value (Mundell, 1993; p.119). 
He argued that fiscal policy, including changes in tax regime, could be used to 
stabilize economic growth without resort to inflation or currency manipulation, and 
while avoiding major recession. He intended to ‚shift the Phillips Curve‛ 
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(Mundell, 1999; Section III), by which he meant reducing the amount of inflation 
that would be associated with a given level of unemployment. 
I asked Mundell, probably in 1991, if he could recommend essential readings on 
supply-side economics. He said, a bit impishly, that it had a ‚mostly oral tradition‛. 
That was not quite accurate, but it is the case that supply-side economics never 
gained more than limited academic circulation. In 1962, Mundell wrote ‚The 
Appropriate Use of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Under Fixed Exchange Rates‛ 
(Mundell, 1968; Ch.16), an excursus into the geometry of monetary, fiscal, and 
capital flow variables - which served as under-pining for the change in the 
Kennedy Administration’s policy. He then wrote ‚The Dollar and the Policy Mix: 
1971‛, which emphasized the importance of fiscal stimulus when gathering 
inflation constrained monetary policy remedies (Mundell, 1971). 
Contours of his argument were captured in a chart, ‚Effective Market 
Classification and the Policy Mix‛,4 with four quadrants representing four possible 
states of macro-economic performance. The vertical axis summarizes monetary 
policy headings of exchange rate, reserve position, and price inflation; the 
horizontal headings pointed to real, internal factors – the rate of domestic economic 
growth and the level of unemployment. For each quadrant, Mundell identified an 
appropriate monetary-fiscal policy mix: 
1) External (balance of payments) surplus, prices flat or declining; combined 
with slow domestic performance.  Correct policy mix response: easier monetary 
policy, domestic tax cuts to boost investment 
2) External surplus, prices flat or declining; domestic economy overheating.  
Policy mix: easier money to prevent currency from rising; tax increases or 
reduced government spending to slow domestic economy 
3) External deficit, perhaps including rising prices; domestic economy over-
heating.  Policy mix: tighter money to stabilize prices and external position; tax 
increases or fiscal contraction to slow domestic economy 
4) External deficit, perhaps including rising prices; domestic economy under-
performing. Policy mix: tighter money conditions to control inflation and 
stabilize external position; and a combination of domestic tax cuts to boost 
investment and deficit spending to boost demand. This is the supply side policy 
mix. (Tax cuts usually increase fiscal deficits, so the supply and demand aspects 
of this policy mix are intertwined.)    
Another macro-economic state is equilibrium: the point on the chart where the 
internal and external balance lines cross.5 If the macro-economy is stable - if prices, 
the foreign position, and domestic growth and employment are about where they 
should be, ie, in something close to a sustainable equilibrium - then no correction 
in macro policy is necessary. Indeed, the goal of effective monetary and fiscal 
policy is to sustain such equilibrium.6 
Mundell argued that fiscal or tax policy had relatively more effect on the 
internal situation than on the exchange rate, while monetary policy had relatively 
more effect on the external balance. The reasoning is that fiscal expansion 
(contraction) may be combined with monetary expansion (contraction) so as not to 
change the existing balance in the supply and demand for money. Fiscal 
intervention therefore need not bring a change in short-term interest rates, or in 
short-term international capital flows. In contrast, monetary expansion 
(contraction), used as a separate policy instrument, works directly through affecting 
the balance of supply and demand for money – hence it more directly affects 
interest rates, international capital flows, and the external balance. (Mundell, 1968; 
p.236)7 
By the time of his 1971 paper, Mundell used ‚external‛ balance more flexibly to 
include domestic price inflation – reserving ‚internal‛ balance to refer to such 
‚real‛ factors as the rates of unemployment and economic growth. He elaborated: 
‚Financial [monetary] instruments should be allocated to financial targets; real 
[fiscal] instruments to real targets‛ (Mundell, 1971; p.17). Adding detail to the 
1962 paper, he noted other channels through which fiscal expansion might work – 
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intended both to boost demand in the Keynesian tradition and to boost the supply 
of goods and services. Looking at policy errors during 1968-1971, he summarized 
supply-side arguments.8 
...[F]iscalists ... made costly errors in 1968. The fiscalists did not consider 
sufficiently the impact of the 1968 tax increase and later fiscal tightness on 
aggregate supply.  They thought it would stop inflation; instead, it lowered 
the expansion rate of real output which aggravated inflation.  (Mundell, 1971; 
p. 22) 
Mundell drew attention to specific effects that lower taxes might have on costs 
and supply – particularly against inflationary backdrops. First, there would be a 
once-for-all effect whereby a tax break would encourage release of built-up 
inventory to realize profits at the lower rates. Second, lower taxes would lessen 
pressure from workers to increase pre-tax incomes, hence softening the cost-push 
feedback loop. (Mundell, 1971; pp. 26-27) A premise driving business and high-
bracket tax cuts is that they could boost investment by raising after-tax profit 
margins -that is, by ‚creat[ing] output incentives‛ (Mundell, 1999; Section III).  
The incentives from such tax reductions, again, are greater when taxes are being 
levied against inflation-bloated nominal profits. 
Supply-side remedies are most effective where monetary expansion is not 
practical - ie, where either inflation is already strong or the central bank is losing 
foreign exchange reserves -and the domestic real economy is weak.9 Consider the 
case of the 1969-1971 recession: 
[M]onetarists underestimated the significance of the fiscal tightness on the 
real economy, the tax drift [ie, bracket creep] due to the monetary inflation, 
and the impact of the tax increase on wage demands. As a result the monetary 
expansion adopted was more inflationary than realized. 
The correct policy mix was a reduction in the rate of monetary expansion ... 
combined with a tax reduction. This would have stopped the inflation rate 
without causing a depression. (Italics in original) (Mundell, 1971; pp.22-23). 
The policy mix approach does not always call for tax reductions. When the 
monetary environment is stable, or even deflationary (eg, equilibrium or quadrants 
#1 or #2), a fiscal- or tax-driven boost in profitability and investment will have one 
of two consequences:   
 either the new profits boost demand in the direction of overheating the 
economy; or 
 monetary policy will be tightened to prevent an over-heating. In the latter 
case, higher after-tax profitability will redistribute wealth to those in higher 
income brackets – while monetary restraint constrains overall economic growth.  
A tax reduction would not be useful under either of such macroeconomic 
circumstances. 
Vietnam spending grew beginning in late 1965. The dollar’s reserve position 
had by then somewhat stabilized from where it had been in 1961-1962, but 
remained precarious; unemployment and growth data were improving, and price 
inflation was mild. The macro-economic situation approached quadrant #3 
conditions: danger of external reserve losses, combined with a strong domestic 
economy. Mundell observed that taxes should have been increased to prevent 
domestic over-heating in the face of a stepped-up war economy (Mundell, 1971; 
p.24); meanwhile, tight money conditions should have been maintained to protect 
US reserves. Instead, the US (via the central bank) resorted to money expansion; 
the money expansion led to an increase in the GDP deflator to about 3 percent in 
1966 and to 5 or 6 percent in 1969-1970. The US policy mix of easy money/ easy 
fiscal was wrong in both dimensions. These 1965 decisions played a role in ending 
the post-WW2 gold exchange standard and stoking worldwide inflation a few years 
later. 
To bring this reasoning forward, gains in economic growth from the second 
Reagan marginal tax cut, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 are hard to parse from the 
data, although there is evidence of shuffling of income from one group to another 
as a result of reforms (Bartlett, 2017).10 As economic growth was largely restored, 
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with much reduced inflation rates, by the mid-1980s, the conditions that would call 
for the quadrant #4 policy mix of tight money/ easy fiscal no longer held. And 
consider the George W. Bush income and capital gains rate reductions of 2001 and 
2003, which were also offered in the context of a fairly stable monetary situation – 
ie, with none of the exchange reserve or inflation pressures Kennedy and Reagan 
faced early in their tenures. By 2004 and 2005, the US economy was over-heating, 
in part because of the earlier tax cuts, which may have contributed to the gathering 
housing boom. The tax bills also contributed to what was a near-doubling of the 
US national debt during Bush’s two terms (Amadeo, 2017). The macro-economic 
situation during Bush’s first term did not call for a fiscal boost.  
An even more interesting case is the capital gains tax cut signed in August 
1997.  Supply-siders have credited the rate reduction with stimulating the economic 
boom and strong stock market of the late 1990s. They were not wrong – but other 
factors were also in play. The Asian financial crisis hit in July 1997, and was 
followed by crises in Russia and Latin America the following year. Currencies 
were devaluing against the dollar, and systemic deflationary pressures were strong. 
The Greenspan Fed was right to provide international dollar liquidity; but a 
consequence was easy monetary conditions in the US, and without inflationary 
pressure. The best historical parallel to the late 1990s was the boom of the late 
1920s – another period of international deflation combined with a strong US gold 
position, easy domestic monetary conditions, and a rising stock market.  Both 
situations fit a quadrant #2 macro-economic scenario: strong external balance 
combined with a very strong domestic economy. The correct policy mix position, 
in both cases, would have been to continue with easy monetary conditions – but 
combined with a tighter fiscal stance to constrain over-heating.11 The 1997 capital 
gains cut did the opposite, it added fuel to the fire. It no doubt contributed to the 
subsequent run-up in technology stock prices, which some have called a ‚bubble‛.12 
 
3. The 2017 Tax Act 
Impressed by evidence from the Kennedy and Reagan tax cuts, some supply-
siders have since wanted to deploy the tight money/ tax cut policy mix (quadrant 
#4) all the time: to wit, they implicitly assert that taxes can never be too low and 
the currency is never too strong. I believe that remains, in 2018, the view of, the 
Wall Street Journal’s Editorial Page; and Forbes of Forbes magazine says ‚gold 
standard‛ and ‚flat tax‛ (at the lower possible rate) whenever the opportunity 
arises. (Erstwhile supply-sider and Reagan advisor Bruce Bartlett, in contrast, 
frequently appears on television to say that macro-economic challenges now are 
quite different from what they were in 1962 or 1980.  He has been a scathing critic 
of the 2017 Tax Act (Bartlett, 2017a). 
This facile supply-side view embraces much of what is in the 2017 Tax Act.  
The Trump Administration and Republican Congress have proceeded as though the 
domestic macro-economic position were weak. It includes significant corporate and 
high-bracket tax cuts, including expanded use of lower-rate pass-throughs. These 
are to be financed through additional government debt issue over the next decade – 
the higher fiscal deficit is usually a feature of an easy fiscal/ tight monetary policy 
mix.13 As it shifts income to those in high tax brackets, it will also result in reduced 
federal and state government contributions to infrastructure, health, and education 
budgets.14 (The package also includes higher standard deductions intended to 
benefit middle income earners; these are to some extent offset by reduced 
deductions for home mortgage interest and state and local tax payments for those 
able to itemize. There is also a case for some reduction in corporate marginal tax 
rates to equalize after-tax rates of return with lower tax foreign jurisdictions, 
regardless of where we are in the business cycle. These changes perhaps have some 
merit as ‚reforms‛ – but they are apart from the macroeconomic policy mix logic 
that energized support for the supply-side policy mix15). In fact, however, the 
macro-economic situation in 2017 very likely did not call for such a policy mix.  
Consider three competing diagnoses. 
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1) By 2017, domestic US unemployment was low, the stock market strong 
and rising, and the dollar steady in the $1.15 - 1.20 per euro range, a level 
higher than during much of the last several years. This depiction resembles 
quadrant #2, an economy with nearly-stable prices but never the less low 
unemployment and over-heated financial markets. The correct policy mix for 
quadrant #2 is steady, or perhaps easier, monetary policy, combined with fiscal 
constraint to prevent overheating. A strong macro-economy does not call for 
deliberately raising fiscal deficits! 
2) An alternative diagnosis is that both external and internal balances look 
fine, and sustainable. In this case, equilibrium best describes the macro-
economic situation; no change is required in either fiscal or monetary policy.  
This diagnosis is probably most likely to be accurate for the US in 2017. (It 
might be the case, of course, that the economy would benefit from other policy 
changes, eg, an improved legal or regulatory environment). Under neither of 
these first two characterizations is the macro-economy underperforming; both 
domestic inflation and unemployment and inflation are well-behaved by 
historical standards. 
3) A contrasting diagnosis of the 2017 macro-economy acknowledges that the 
dollar is strong and inflation is controlled, even below target – but looks at 
falling work force participation level (as opposed to the improved 
unemployment rate or soaring stock market) to conclude that the domestic real 
economy remains weak.16 If we accept this diagnosis, we are closer to quadrant 
#1, for which the appropriate policy mix would then be easier money combined 
with fiscal loosening. This is the only diagnosis of the 2017 macro-economic 
situation that can support the case for supply-side tax cuts or, indeed, for any 
fiscal stimulus. 
But even here, the case for tax cuts is weak. First, unlike the stronger supply-
side scenario depicted in quadrant #4, where the policy mix demands monetary 
constraint, the policy response for quadrant #1 includes monetary expansion.  
Second, a soft economy combined with a persistently rising stock market suggests 
that corporate profits are driven at least in part by redistribution upward -to 
shareholders - rather than by strongly expanding aggregate demand. A tax cut 
under such circumstances would aggravate regressive distributional consequences. 
A preferable policy response -in the somewhat unusual event of a weak economy 
combined with a strong stock market (particularly where inflation is under control 
and the currency is stable)- might be to emphasize the role of monetary expansion 
in boosting aggregate demand.  
Considerations of policy mix and where we are in the business cycle aside, a 
defense offered for the sharp corporate tax reduction – from 35 to 21 percent – is 
that some of the new cash flow will finance higher wages. That is doubtful. From a 
static consideration, both S&P 500 and Dow Industrial stock indexes are up 20x 
(nominally) since 1980, indicating healthy growth in profitability and expectation 
of more. But below higher bracket incomes, wages and salaries have risen much 
less; many earnings categories have been essentially flat.17 This pattern suggests 
that corporate profits have not much correlated with wage levels; in the face of 
immigration and foreign out-sourcing, the effective supply of labor has been fairly 
elastic, and the market price for it fairly stable. Whatever the theory, we know that 
wages did not increase after enactment of the 1986 tax cuts: on balance, they seem 
instead to have fallen over the subsequent decade (Bartlett, 2017b). 
A more dynamic argument is that higher corporate cash flows might boost 
investment and hence bring more innovation and higher productivity.  Maybe -but 
the economics of productivity are complicated, and their conclusions disputed.  
Despite lots of access to finance, profits, and gains in higher income brackets since 
the 1980s, there has been relatively little payoff in terms of productivity gain.   
Indeed, according to Robert Gordon’s recent study, productivity- measured by total 
factor productivity – increased by historic proportions during the 1930s and WW2 
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not because of high returns on corporate investment, but rather as what appears an 
effort to reverse downward pressure on them (Gordon, 2016; Ch.16). 
Arguably, government support for education and for R&D spending can also 
contribute to productivity improvements; but the Tax Act implicitly intends to 
discourage such discretionary spending -through both the constraint of higher fiscal 
deficits and deliberate squeezing of state budgets.  US data indicate a decline in US 
high school graduation rates since 2000, as well as poor US secondary school 
achievement rankings relative to those in other countries. Meanwhile, tuition 
inflation and growing tuition debt, alongside very much reduced state-level 
spending on higher education, have made it harder for those of lower and middle 
income backgrounds to complete college.  Gordon (2016; pp.624-627) concludes 
that problems with US education, including under-investment, have become a 
‚headwind‛ against productivity improvement. 
Still another hypothesis (contrary to the view that productivity improvements 
follow mostly upon greater after-tax profits) points to the role of labor organization 
in stabilizing work forces, and hence in improving work conditions, compensation, 
and productivity.  According to one explanation: 
The shift to the eight-hour day must have had a direct effect in boosting 
productivity...  However, the main upward stimulus to productivity must have 
come from the impetus of higher hourly wages, particularly during the late 
1930s, that led firms to economize on the use of labor. This helps us to 
understand the explosion of productivity during World War II.  (Gordon, 
2016; p.543) 
By extension, the relative decline of labor unions in the private sector, and the 
expansion of contract and part-time work suggest a lessening of such earlier 
practices.18 
It is possible, of course, to agree that the above policy mix quadrants accurately 
describe policy choices, but to argue also that even in macro-economic equilibrium 
the US economy has too large a role (or too small a role) for the government in 
infrastructure, health and education.19Indeed, the best way to understand the 
position of Moore, Laffer, Kudlow and Forbes, despite their invoking of Kennedy- 
and Reagan-era parallels, is that they believe the government’s present role in these 
areas is too large. From a policy mix consideration, 2017 has more in common with 
circumstances of the later years of the 1980s and the second Bush’s first term. If a 
general case is to be made for smaller government and less taxation, it should be 
made without overlaying it with policy mix macroeconomics.   
 
4. Takeaways, and looking forward 
As the gold-linked post-WW2 standard broke down and systemic inflation took 
hold in the 1970s, Mundell played an important role in thinking through the 
limitations of Keynesian, monetarist, and rational expectations models and 
responses. A portion of that response was to use aggressive fiscal stimulus in 
situations where monetary policy was constrained – the supply-side policy mix. 
There is some evidence that fiscal expansion, including tax rate cuts aided 
economic recovery in situations where monetary expansion was impractical – that 
is, for the 1964 and 1981 tax cuts.  Evidence for the economic growth impact of tax 
cuts is weaker where they have has been implemented in other macro-economic 
environments.   
Circumstances in the US have not called for a quadrant #4, easy fiscal/ tight 
money remedy since systemic inflation was diminished during the early years of 
the Volcker Fed.20 It is ironic that monetary policy, which Mundell proposed should 
be used to secure external balance, is now directed mostly toward stabilizing 
internal variables of growth rate and unemployment level. Fed Chairmen 
Greenspan and Bernanke wrote memoirs that scarcely mention the dollar’s foreign 
exchange value.21 But exchange rate management has a higher priority in 
economies that have linked their currencies to an outside standard. Under such 
currency frameworks, the supply-side policy mix may come to have unexpected 
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applications. It has played an important role, even if it is scarcely acknowledged, in 
improving economic performance in the Eurozone.  
 
4.1. Policy mix in the Eurozone 
The Eurozone macro-economy since 2009 points to suitability of combining 
inevitable monetary rigidity with an easy fiscal stance, particularly in euro-
periphery countries (beginning with Greece) that have experienced sharp 
contraction and depression-level unemployment. The Eurozone’s stagnation trap 
has often been attributed to the single currency zone – that is, to the inability of 
periphery economies to escape contraction through devaluation. In fact, improved 
Eurozone performance since about 2015 suggests that earlier stagnation might 
better be attributed to 1) overall restrictive ECB monetary policy; and 2) resistance 
by the ECB and the European Commission (sometimes endorsed by the IMF) to 
authorizing sovereign debt write-downs.22 
Roll-over of un-serviceable debt kept affected economics locked for years into 
primary fiscal surpluses. As summarized by the Financial Times’ Martin Sandbu: 
Europe had embraced fiscal austerity with unseemly enthusiasm in the 
crisis.  The motivation had been the fear of public debt stocks rising from 
already high levels.  The turn to austerity was the logical twin of the taboo 
on default: an obsession with squeezing the flow of new debt rather than 
cutting the stock of outstanding debt.  The result was to kill off the 
recovery, worsening debt burdens further and straining the financial 
integrity of the Eurozone as a result  (Sandbu, 2015; p.155). 
Write-down of sovereign debt would allow affected countries to move from 
contractionary primary fiscal surplus to an ‚easier‛ primary balance or even deficit 
– either through increased public spending or tax cuts. Aggregate demand and 
capital inflows would then begin to recover.  Indeed, this shift to debt write-down 
has permitted an easier fiscal stance to be (slowly) implemented since 2012, and it 
has been an important factor in improving economic outcomes in the Euro-zone 
periphery. While unrecognized as such publicly, it is an almost-textbook use of the 
policy mix Mundell advocated in his 1962 paper, and which led to the Kennedy tax 
cut – where externally-driven monetary constraint should be paired against fiscal 
expansion (Mundell, 1968).23 
 
4.2. Political context of 2017 Tax Act 
In 1960, there was much public concern about how to adopt a policy mix that 
would allow the US to prosper without inflation, and especially without losing 
international reserves. By 1980, the burden of price inflation had risen, likely by 
enough to have contributed to Reagan’s election. More than three decades later, 
inflation is no longer a pressing concern. The most visible public economic issue 
has instead become increasing domestic income and wealth disparity in the context 
of a world economy of growing inter-connectedness. While voting patterns are 
complicated, it seems a safe inference that resentments resulting from increasing 
income dispersion contributed to Trump’s election in 2016. Further, reflecting 
growing inequality and structural rigidity, a recent United Nations report noted ‚the 
US now has the lowest rate of social mobility of any of the rich countries.‛ The 
report goes on to estimate that budgetary consequences of the 2017 Tax Act are 
likely to weaken what there is of any American safety net. (United Nations, 2017)  
Of the trimming of public benefits likely to result from the Act, Pulitzer Prize-
winning historian Joseph Ellis comments: ‚This is a repudiation of the social 
contract that Franklin Roosevelt announced at the New Deal.‛ (Goodman, & 
Cohen, 2017). 
These are adequate grounds for caution about introducing tax policies likely 
disproportionately to benefit those in higher tax brackets – especially absent a 
compelling macro-economic policy mix rationale for doing so. Perhaps the US 
should look for a different sort of policy mix to boost economic growth while 
reducing inequality. For example, it may be time to consider deregulation of entry 
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barriers, zoning practices, intellectual property and patent law, and occupational 
licensing – all of which have created rigidities in the working of the market 
economy.24 Any tax changes required to implement such deregulation would not 
require the regressive changes implicit in the 2017 Tax Act. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 See account in Mundell (1999, Section II). 
2 ‚Bracket creep‛ refers to interaction between progressive income taxation and inflation. Taxpayers 
move into higher tax brackets as price inflation brings about an increase in nominal taxable income 
– even in the event that real income is unchanged. 
3 Prominent supply siders included, among others, the four names listed at the outset, Bruce Bartlett, 
Paul Craig Roberts, and several members of the Wall Street Journal’s Editorial Page. Mundell had 
several often-recounted meetings with the last beginning in late 1974.  Two WSJ writers went on to 
author important popular books on supply side economics, (Wanniski, 1978 and Bartley, 1992).  
4 Eg, (Salvatore, 1993); Figure 17-6.  An earlier version of the chart appears in Mundell (1968; Figure 
16-1).  
5 Point F in (Salvatore, 1993, Figure 17-6); point Q in (Mundell, 1968; Figure 16-1). 
6 Eg, targeting nominal GDP growth seeks directly to stabilize demand. Other approaches, including 
targeting money supply, the rate of inflation, and interest rates, seek indirect stabilization of 
demand.  
7 Also summarized in (Salvatore, 1993; pp.544-545). 
8 This bears emphasis because one sometimes hears that (Mundell, 1971) made only a ‚Keynesian‛ 
demand side argument.  In fact, the argument that cutting (raising) taxes could increase (reduce) 
aggregate supply was already embedded in the 1971 paper. 
9 That is, where quadrant #4 conditions apply. 
10 Bartlett (2017a) cites (Auerback & Slemrod, 1997). 
11 Regarding the earlier period, the US instead moved to tighter money by 1928, and maintained it 
until 1933.  France, the other gold reserve-rich country at the time, became a source of systemic 
deflation as early as 1927.  Meanwhile, US fiscal policy was quite easy, as the sharply-lowered tax 
regime introduced a few years earlier by Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon remained in place. 
These factors, especially the monetary policies, played a determinant role in bringing on the Great 
Depression. (Johnson, 1997) 
12 I am not aware that Mundell ever offered this policy mix analysis for the late 1990s.  I do recall a 
comment at the AEA convention in January 2001, during a session recognizing Mundell’s Nobel 
award – a combination Fest and roast.  A past colleague (whose name I have lost, unfortunately) 
remarked that, while Mundell was best known for advocacy of the easy fiscal/ tight money policy 
mix, the post-financial crisis situation appeared to call for the opposite: tight fiscal policy and easy 
money.  So the observation above is not original with me. 
13 If lower tax rates were indeed to generate higher tax revenues, then fiscal deficits might not be part 
of the package. 
14 Tax Policy Center (2017), Scott & Chang (2017), and Matthews (2017). 
15 The House GOP put out a paper in June 2016 outlining details of a tax reform plan – one that 
appears not to use the term ‚supply side‛ and is intended to be revenue-neutral (US House of 
Representatives, 2016). It is outside the scope of this study to evaluate the Republican blueprint, but 
for a favorable review, see Goodman & Kotiloff (2017). 
16 (BLS, 2017).  The US labor force participation rate reached a high point of around 67 percent 
during 1999-2000, then dropped steadily from about 66 percent in 2007 to about 62 ½ percent in 
2015; it has since steadied, and has even risen slightly to about 63 percent. 
17 Inter alia, see charts in (Mishel, Gould & Bivens, 2015). 
18 For one interpretation of evidence, see (Eisenbrey, 2007). 
19 One could also conclude that the role of government is too small. 
20 Volcker was appointed Federal Reserve Chairman in 1979 and served into 1987. 
21 Greenspan (2007); Bernanke (2017). For an argument that exchange rate management should have 
been a higher priority in US policy during the financial crisis and recession of 2007-2009, see 
Johnson, (2017), Section 3: Financial Crisis. 
22 For detail, see Sandbu (2015). 
23 Mundell has been called the ‚father of the Euro‛, which correctly suggests his embrace of fixed-
exchange rate frameworks.  My conclusion that the Euro-Zone periphery needed a tight money/ 
easy fiscal solution draws on analysis in Mundell (1968 and 1971); but I am not aware that Mundell 
himself has linked his earlier work to the more recent Euro-Zone issues in the way presented here. 
24 Consider Lindsey & Teles (2017). 
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